Pensions for an Aging Population by Peter Diamond
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES








The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National
Bureau of Economic Research.
©2005 by Peter A. Diamond.  All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may
be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.Pensions for an Aging Population
Peter A. Diamond




After presenting the Gruber-Wise analysis showing a strong effect on retirement of implicit taxes
from pension rules, it is shown that there is no effect of these implicit taxes on unemployment. This
supports the argument for avoiding high implicit taxes on continued work. Also discussed are
methods for adjusting benefits and taxes for increases in life expectancy, with particular attention
to increasing "the retirement age." Calculations are presented showing the decreases in benefits for
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For many national pensions systems, anticipated revenues are not sufficient to pay 
all of anticipated benefits under current rules.  In some countries, reform proposals to 
achieve financial balance have generated a great deal of controversy.  On the other hand, 
there is wide agreement among analysts about some principles for reform.  Today, I want 
to consider two non-controversial issues, issues that are, nevertheless, relevant for 
France.  In particular, I will consider the incentives to continue working beyond the 
earliest age at which a worker can claim a retirement benefit and (very briefly) the 
encouragement of adequate voluntary savings for workers who will have longer life 




  Viewed in the setting of a century or two, economically advanced countries have 
experienced two striking changes – large increases in average life expectancy and large 
decreases in the average age at which (long-career) workers stop working (or stop 
holding full-time jobs) (Costa, 1998).  This trend has been accompanied by a drop in the 
length of the average working year as well.  Trend growth in real earnings plays a central 
role in these phenomena.  Higher earnings and tax-financed higher public expenditures 
contribute to longer lives by providing a higher standard of living and by financing 
improvements in public health and in medical knowledge and its application.  Higher 
                                                 
1 Presented at IDEI Annual Conference, Toulouse, November 2, 2005.  I am grateful to Nick 
Barr, Olivier Blanchard, Didier Blanchet, Helmut Cremer, Jean Marie Lozachmeur, Georges 
DeMenil and Alicia Munnell for comments and to Maisy Wong for research assistance. 
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earnings support decreased work, on both annual and lifetime time scales, by allowing 
higher consumption despite decreased work.   
 
With longer lives and shorter work-lives, the average retirement period has been 
growing at both ends.  This has occurred despite a long-term trend improvement in the 
health of older people and a trend decrease in the physical demands of paid labor.  In 
some countries, the last 20 years has seen an end to the trend to earlier retirement, but 
with stability, not a trend reversal.  Thus a key starting point for my thinking about 
retirement income policies is anticipation of a continued trend to longer lives and no 
comparable (proportional) trend in the length of working lives (barring radical decreases 
in the support of retirement incomes). 
 
  While the trends suggest a powerful role for what economists call income effects, 
it is also clear that the rules governing access to retirement pensions and the rules relating 
the size of monthly retirement benefits to the age at which they start also play an 
important role in determining retirement behavior.  One source of evidence for this 
conclusion comes from following the labor force experience in particular countries when 
the countries change the rules governing public provision of pensions.  Introducing an 
earlier age at which workers can access benefits results in considerable numbers of 
workers retiring earlier.  This was evident when the US lowered the earliest age at which 
men could claim benefits from 65 to 62, enacted in 1961.  Such a response is likely to be 
present whether the pension system is defined benefit or defined contribution.   
 
A complementary source of evidence for the importance of pension rules comes 
from comparing experiences across countries with similar economic standing.  I begin by 
describing one such analysis, done by Jonathan Gruber and David Wise (1999), based on 
a collaborative project that has been analyzing pensions and retirement in 11 countries, 
including France.    
 
Incentives to retire 
   3 
  When younger workers earn, they pay taxes on their earnings, they make 
contributions to retirement programs, and they increase the anticipated value of future 
retirement (and disability) pensions.  All three of these implications of higher earnings 
affect the incentive to be in the labor market and the incentive to seek higher earnings.  
Once a worker is eligible to start receipt of a retirement pension, two additional factors 
affect the incentive to continue working.  One is pension income that would not be paid if 
the worker does not stop working, or, perhaps, reduce earnings or change employers.  
Second is the increase in future pension benefits that will occur if the start of benefits is 
delayed as a consequence of continued earnings.  Economists have studied how these 
financial incentives are important among the factors that affect work and retirement 
decisions.   
 
A simple way to measure the incentives inherent in pension rules is to calculate an 
implicit tax on earnings; that is, the decrease in expected lifetime income as a 
consequence of the pension rules should a worker continue earning for another year.  The 
studies in the Gruber-Wise volume calculated such implicit taxes for each of the 11 
countries in the project.  And they defined a variable they named the “tax force” by 
adding up the implicit taxes from the age at which a male worker becomes eligible to 
claim a retirement benefit up to age 70.
2  In a crude, aggregate way, this variable 
measures the extent to which the design of the pension system contains a financial 
incentive to do less work. 
 
To see how this measure of retirement incentives is related to retirement across 
their sample of countries, they used a simple aggregative labor supply measure.  For each 
age between 55 and 65, they calculated the fraction of the male population not in the 
labor force and then added up these fractions over these ages.  They named the variable 
“unused productive capacity.”  Figure 1, copied from their book, shows the scatter 
diagram of tax force and unused productive capacity for each of the countries in their 
                                                 
2 The focus here on male labor force experience recognizes that increases in female career 
patterns that have marked many countries in recent decades have varied in timing and size across 
countries, making it harder to isolate the impact of pension rules on labor supply by analysis 
across countries.   4 
sample.  They also reported other measures to confirm that their results were not sensitive 
to the particular definitions.  Figure 2 shows a regression line of unused productive 
capacity on the logarithm of the tax force, using their data, with the coefficients reported 
in Table 1.  As you can see there is a strong correlation and a sizable, statistically 
significant coefficient.
3  Moreover, time series evidence and analyses based on individual 
data suggest that at least a large part of this correlation is causation from implicit tax 
incentives to early retirement.
4 
 
Good incentives to retire 
 
Countries need taxes in order to have government expenditures and in order to 
support the incomes of those less well-off financially.  While some (particularly in the 
US) seem to view all taxes as bad, economists recognize the vital role played by taxes.  
Economists are concerned with structuring taxes in a way that does less harm to the 
efficiency of the economy while addressing the country’s goals of revenue raising, 
income distribution and the provision of social insurance. While economists disagree on 
the extent of efficiency costs associated with different taxes, they agree that when tax 
rates on earnings get too high, the costs become too large.   
 
This conclusion holds as well for the implicit taxes associated with retirement 
pensions – for those eligible for retirement benefits, the pension system’s implicit tax on 
continued work should not be very large.  The underlying logic is that some workers 
enjoy their work and want to continue working beyond what many consider a suitable 
retirement age.  Others no longer enjoy their work (if they ever did) and are eager to stop 
working as soon as they can afford a decent retirement.  A good retirement income 
system will not overly discourage the first group from continuing to work at ages at 
which the second group will indeed retire.  This view is widely, perhaps nearly 
                                                 
3 At the mean, the elasticity of unused capacity with respect to tax force is 0.36. 
4 It is appropriate to search for reasons why there may be reverse causation.  One possible story of 
how the causation might go the other way is that a country that had a lot of early retirement 
simply did not bother designing the pension incentives to preserve the incentive to work.  A taste 
for early retirement does not represent a good economic reason for ignoring retirement incentives, 
but could conceivably influence the political process.   5 
universally, held by economists.  However, some (too many) non-economists believe that 
encouraging early retirement is valuable for its impact on the unemployment of younger 
workers. 
 
Early retirement and unemployment 
 
       If the level of employment in an economy at each time were independent of the 
retirement incentives in the national pension system, then inducing an older worker to 
retire would provide a job to some other worker.  But in a market economy (or a planned 
economy for that matter) the level of employment demand is not independent of the 
willingness of older workers to retire.  Firms seek to hire more workers when it is 
expected to be profitable to hire more workers.  Anticipated profitability depends on 
anticipated revenue from sales.  But it also depends on the ease of finding suitable 
workers and the anticipated cost of hiring them relative to their productivity.  When more 
workers are available, firms are more willing to hire because suitable labor is easier to 
find and equilibrium earnings tend to be somewhat lower.  Thus the number of jobs is 
variable, depending on the number of workers available – implicit-tax-induced early 
retirement can result in a decrease in jobs so that no simple link exists between earlier 
retirements and lower unemployment.  While that is the basic theory, it is important to 
examine the empirical evidence, as was done for the impact of pension incentives on 
labor force participation.   
 
As noted above, from a long historic perspective, developed countries have seen a 
strong trend decrease in the average retirement age.  Yet unemployment rates have not 
shown a similar trend decrease, as would be the case if earlier retirement reduced 
unemployment. This shows a strong tendency to a rough (and only rough) balance 
between labor demand and supply – decreased availability of workers decreases the 
availability of jobs.  If we tried to examine this issue in time series analysis for a single 
country, we would need to pay attention to the fact that the business cycle tends to impact 
both unemployment and early retirement – among those losing their jobs in a recession, 
some workers retire rather than continuing to search for employment.  Thus, a simple   6 
positive correlation between early retirement and unemployment would not, by itself, 
disprove the fallacy that more early retirement decreases unemployment.  
 
To get around this issue, I use the tax force variable of Gruber and Wise together 
with data on male unemployment rates in the same countries.  To hold down the 
importance of the business cycle for the analysis, unemployment will be measured by a 
decade long average unemployment rate.  In addition, rather than relating unemployment 
directly to the retirement of older workers, measured by their unused capacity, I will 
relate unemployment rates to the log of tax force, which is not directly affected by the 
business cycle.  This linkage can be interpreted in two ways.  One is to show directly that 
large implicit taxes to encourage early retirement do not succeed in lowering 
unemployment rates.  A second interpretation is that the log of tax force is being used as 
an instrument in an instrumental variables regression of unemployment on early 
retirement, as measured by unused productive capacity.  Figure 3 shows the regression of 
unemployment rates on the log of tax force, as reported in Table 2.  Table 3 shows the 
instrumental variables regression.    
 
Under both interpretations, this empirical evidence shows no systematic pattern 
whereby countries that encourage early retirement have lower male unemployment.
5  Of 
course, one must also consider the possibility that the empirical findings are coming from 
the reverse causation, that following mistaken policies, countries that have consistently 
high unemployment set high implicit taxes on continued work.  The presence of a 
coefficient that is very close to zero suggests that this interpretation would require a 
balancing of the direct causation and the reverse causation. While I can not rule out this 
possibility, it does seem unlikely.  Future work by the international team working with 
Gruber and Wise should be able to explore this link between retirement policies and 
unemployment in great detail making use of incentive measures and unemployment rates 
year-by-year.  
                                                 
5 Use of total unemployment results in a considerably larger coefficient, but one that is positive, 
not negative, and still statistically insignificant by a wide margin, as reported in Appendix Table 
1.  Moreover, as noted above, country differences in trend and level of female labor force 
participation, makes the use of male-only data somewhat cleaner.   7 
 
Thus it is a mistaken policy to have very high implicit taxes that strongly 
encourage early retirement (and which may affect the pension system long term) as a 
response to unemployment which is generally shorter term and not systematically 
improved long-term.  Discouraging work by high implicit taxes is an example of large 
inefficiencies (deadweight burdens) which do not accomplish social goals and should be 
avoided.  
 
Good incentives to retire 
 
  I conclude that pension systems should avoid high implicit taxes on continued 
work past the age at which retirement benefits can first be claimed.  Low (or zero) 
implicit taxes happen automatically with a defined contribution system and can be part of 
the design of a defined benefit system.  For example, Sweden has adopted a form of 
defined benefit system called a notional defined contribution system, which parallels a 
funded defined contribution system in benefit rules but need not be funded (or fully 
funded).  Such a system has low implicit taxes on continued work.  By relating benefit 
levels to the age at which they start, a defined benefit system can have low implicit taxes 
without being a notional defined contribution system.  For example, the U.S. avoids high 
implicit taxes at early retirement ages by sufficiently large actuarial reductions for 
benefits claimed early.  That is, in the US continued work past age 62 lowers the extent to 
which benefits are reduced because of retirement before the age for full benefits.  The 
change in the reduction for early retirement is sufficient to roughly balance the delay of 
benefits for a year for the average worker.   
 
The Swedish and US approaches differ in that the Swedish system has an 
automatic adjustment process based on realized mortality rates while the US sets the 
adjustments for delay by legislation.
6  Thus adjustments that make sense when first 
legislated can get out of line with actual (interest rate and) mortality experience even 
                                                 
6 One can have an automatic adjustment for the change in benefits with work beyond the earliest 
entitlement age without necessarily having an automatic adjustment for benefits at the earliest 
entitlement age.  Sweden has both.   8 
when they are set right to begin.  And I should note that while the US has had low 
implicit taxes at younger retirement ages, this has not been the case at higher ages. 
 
With a defined contribution system, assuming no change in interest rates or cohort 
mortality expectations or degree of price competition in annuitization, the change in the 
level of monthly benefits from a delayed start in benefits would be roughly “actuarially 
fair.”  That is, the expected present discounted value of benefits would be roughly the 
same whether or not the pool of annuitants who are combined in a single risk 
classification delay claiming benefits.  Continued contributions while working would 
raise the benefit level as would a delayed start in benefits.  As noted above, defined 
benefit systems can adjust benefits to achieve the same end.   
 
However, it is worth noting that being exactly actuarially fair is not, in general, a 
necessary condition for an optimal adjustment.  Deviations from exact actuarial fairness 
can improve economic outcomes in realistic settings.  Life expectancies vary among 
workers retiring at the same age and subject to the same pension rules.  Given the 
uncertainty of employment opportunities (which are subject to asymmetric information) a 
positive implicit tax on continued work is part of a good design of insurance about the 
quality of employment opportunities in the range of retirement ages.  Moreover, in the 
US, and I suspect more widely, earlier retirees tend to have had lower earnings and tend 
to have higher mortality rates.  An adjustment in implicit taxes can reflect this fact even if 
the benefit formula itself is proportional to lifetime earnings, rather than being a 
progressive formula, as is the case in the US.  But examination of these reasons for 
deviation from exact actuarial fairness does not lead one to favor large implicit taxes. 
 
Increasing life expectancy and pension rules 
 
Populations are aging as a consequence of both decreased fertility rates and 
decreased mortality rates.  I want to focus on the latter.  In thinking about how pension 
systems should be modified to deal with increases in life expectancy, it is helpful to 
examine how a worker would sensibly react to a change in life expectancy, if that worker   9 
relied only on his or her own resources. On learning that he or she will live longer than 
previously expected, an individual worker would realize that the previously planned 
length of career would not be sufficient to finance the previously planned level of 
consumption.  The worker could restore lifetime financial balance by a mix of three 
changes: consuming less before retirement (that is, saving more), consuming less during 
retirement, or working longer. A sensible approach would likely involve all three.  That 
is, I do not think that job opportunities and work difficulty will evolve so that it would be 
optimal to adjust working life and earnings in proportion to life expectancy, which would 
then permit the same consumption as before.  This view is further supported by the 
anticipated growth in wage rates with continued technical progress, which, as discussed 
above, is likely to further support less-than-proportional increases in working lives, if 
they increase at all. 
 
Now, consider how a pension system relates to these three individual responses.  
If a pension system does not have large implicit taxes on continued work, as I have 
argued ought to be the case, then pension benefits are higher for those who start them at a 
later age. A good system thus already allows for one response to increases in life 
expectancy: working longer in order to enjoy higher annual benefits.  
 
The other two elements of individual adjustment correspond to an increase in the 
payroll tax rate (consuming less and saving more before retirement) and a reduction in 
monthly benefits for any given age at retirement (consuming less during retirement). 
Both responses thus involve reductions in consumption, one before retirement and the 
other after. A good approach would include both of these, unless the current system had 
either much too high a tax rate and replacement rate or much too low a tax rate and 
replacement rate.  In addition to deciding the mix of revenue and benefit changes in order 
to have long-run financial balance, there is the issue of whether adjustments should be 
automatic or not. 
 
Different pension rules for different cohorts 
   10 
Legislated systems stay in force for cohorts born over successive years, 
sometimes over many successive years.  So, how should a system approach the problem 
of adjusting to differences across cohorts, differences that are anticipated and differences 
that develop as earnings growth and mortality rates actually evolve?  This issue arises in 
the determination of the size of the system – how tax rates and benefit levels should vary 
across cohorts.  As noted above, this issue also arises in the adjustments for early and late 
retirement 
 
It is widely thought that mortality rates are very likely to continue to decline well 
into the future.  However, demographers and actuaries disagree significantly about how 
rapid an improvement to expect.  Indeed, such improvements have historically varied 
from year to year, and even from decade to decade. Thus we should expect significant 
deviations in the future from current mortality projections, even if those projections are 
accurate on average over long periods. That is, projections of mortality improvements are 
subject to considerable uncertainty.  As a result, if current legislation sets future levels of 
taxes and benefits, they are unlikely to line up appropriately with realized mortality rates.  
Of course, it is always possible to change the pension parameters.  But legislating change 
may be difficult and may be slow. 
 
Indeed, we can think of current legislation of future pension rules as a default 
option.  It is possible to change the rules, but the default option has a powerful effect on 
actual legislation and future legislation may not be enacted even if that would be 
advantageous.  As a result, some automatic indexing of pension system parameters 
provides a better default option for the parameters than without indexing.  In its notional 
defined contribution system, Sweden has included automatic indexing for both benefits at 
the earliest eligibility age and the increase in benefits for delayed retirement.   
 
Such automatic changes should follow three principles.  First, the rules should 
relate to the date of birth not the date of retirement.  Otherwise many workers will retire 
just before a reduction in the benefit formula in response to improved mortality.  Such an 
incentive to retire is inefficient.  Second, changes should be made annually.  Otherwise   11 
the system will produce large changes in benefit levels across nearby cohorts.  Such large 
changes are inequitable, as benefits will differ more significantly between those born in 
successive calendar years, some of whom are born just days apart.  Large changes are 
also more difficult to sustain politically.  And third, it is better to have explicit rules for 
changing benefits, rather than relying on some group to review and adjust them in light of 
experience.  Greater predictability and decreased political pressures seem better with 
automatic adjustment with given rules.  Nevertheless, there always remains the option of 
legislation to change whatever the automatic rules produce.  
 
Automatic adjustment can be made to work without overreliance on projecting 
mortality, which could easily be politicized.  That is, a system may function better if it 
adjusts benefits based on realized mortality information, not projections.  In Sweden, this 
is done by using historic mortality data in pension calculations without any adjustment 
for anticipated post-retirement improvements in mortality.   
 
A further issue is the extent to which the financial shortfall generated by 
improved mortality should be met by revenue increases or by reductions in monthly 
benefits, recognizing that increasing expected lives increases lifetime benefits.  Sweden 
chose to do all of the automatic adjustment by reducing benefits.  With no planned 
increase in taxes, a defined contribution system, such as in Chile, would do the same.  
And a similar approach was proposed for the US by a commission appointed by President 
Bush.  In contrast, Peter Orszag and I (2005) selected a half-and-half adjustment in our 
proposed automatic indexing for the US since we think that with its very low tax rate and 
replacement rate (by international standards) the US can do better by covering part of the 
increase in the cost of providing benefits for longer lives through tax increases, thereby 
lessening the rate of decline of replacement rates that would occur with no tax 
adjustment.  Such an increase is in keeping with how sensible individual lifetime plans 
would change as life expectancy increases and wages rise to reflect productivity growth.
7  
                                                 
7 Peter Orszag and I proposed the following mechanism: each year the Office of the Chief 
Actuary would calculate the net cost to US Social Security from the improvement in life 
expectancy observed in the most recent data. This would be done by comparing the cost of 
benefits for different cohorts, using successive mortality tables.  Our proposal for the US is for   12 
 
Increasing the retirement age 
 
Discussions of adjusting pension systems for greater life expectancy often include 
the idea of increasing “the retirement age.”  This form of expression links together 
parameters of the pension benefit rules (one or both of the earliest age for claiming 
benefits and the age for full benefits) with the average age at which workers actually 
retire.  It is important to distinguish among these three concepts.  Legislation can directly 
change the pension benefit rules.  But the link between rules and when people actually 
retire depends on the behavior of workers and other changes happening in the economy.  
So it is important to focus on the rules set by legislation. 
 
Sweden mimics the vocabulary of a funded defined contribution system by having 
an earliest age at which benefits can be claimed (which is 61) without identifying a 
concept of an age for full benefits, often referred to as a normal retirement age.  Then 
Sweden adjusts monthly benefits for life expectancy by calculating the level of benefits 
that costs the same as with shorter life expectancy.  Thus if Sweden were to change the 
earliest age from 61 to 62 with no other changes, workers who would have claimed 
benefits at 61 would be without benefits for this year, but then would have larger monthly 
benefits for the rest of their lives.  Since the system is roughly actuarially fair, this 
increase from 61 to 62 would have no noticeable impact on the finances of the pension 
system.  This would hold for any system that is roughly actuarially fair.  Thus choice of 
an earliest age needs to reflect some principle other than directly contributing to financial 
balance.   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
half of this “net cost of increased life expectancy” to be offset by a proportional reduction in 
benefits, which would apply to all covered workers age 59 and younger. (Once a worker reaches 
age 60, the rules for his or her benefits would be finalized and would not change further in 
response to ongoing life expectancy changes in order to reduce uncertainty at this stage of 
retirement planning.) The other half of the “net cost of increased life expectancy” would be met 
by automatic payroll tax rate increases, meant to balance the actuarial effects of the benefit 
reductions over a seventy-five-year period.   13 
Mandatory pension systems are mandatory because of a concern that left to their 
own devices too many workers would not save adequately for retirement.  This concern 
does not go away as workers age and is the basis for judging what would be a good 
earliest age for claiming benefits.  Increasing the earliest age from 61 to 62 would hurt 
workers who ought to start benefits at 61, given their job opportunities, financial position 
and life expectancy (including the position of their spouses).  On the other hand, insofar 
as there are workers who are starting benefits at 61 but would be better off if they waited 
until 62, increasing the earliest age for claiming benefits helps such workers.  Choice of 
an appropriate earliest age for claiming should balance these two factors.   
 
If replacement rates shrink in response to longer lives, it becomes more plausible 
that a better earliest age is a later one.  But, I have not seen any appealing simple 
principle for adjusting the earliest eligibility age in step with life expectancy.  Such a link 
would need to be based on an expectation of how much longer people who retire early 
should work in response to lower mortality rates. But the age at which it is sensible for a 
worker to retire depends on more than just life expectancy. It depends as well on a 
worker’s ability to work, interest in work, and the availability of jobs.  All of these will 
change as mortality decreases, but not necessarily in a simple relation to life expectancy. 
A sensible retirement age also depends on the extent to which, because of higher 
earnings, workers are more interested in retiring earlier.  Furthermore, the diversity in the 
labor force and the appropriateness (in some cases the need) for some workers to take 
early retirement also underscore the importance of preserving early retirement options. 
And future declines in mortality will widen the variance in ages at death, which is also 
exacerbated by income-related differences in the rates of decline in mortality rates. These 
factors, if anything, increase the importance of providing an option of early retirement 
for those with shorter life expectancy.   
 
“Increasing the retirement age” can refer to increasing the age and/or years of 
service used to determine receipt of what is sometimes referred to as full retirement 
benefits.  One can index the system to life expectancy by raising the age for full benefits   14 
in some relation to life expectancy.
8  This can be done with or without indexing the 
earliest age at which benefits can be claimed. Increasing the age for full benefits, 
however, is merely an alternative method of reducing benefits, one that affects workers 
retiring at different ages in somewhat different ways.  I illustrate this for the system in the 
US, where the benefit calculation does not depend on a measurement of years of service.  




Under current legislation, the age for full benefits in the US will eventually reach 
67.  When that has happened, the calculation of benefits based on the individual’s 
earnings record will be adjusted as shown in Figure 4.  Here we see that at age 67 a 
worker receives 100 percent of the calculation based on the earnings record.  Those 
starting benefits earlier receive less, while those starting later receive more – up to age 
70.  In contrast, if the age for full benefits were 70 rather than 67, the adjustment for the 
age at which benefits start would change, as shown in Figure 5.  From the relative sizes 
of the bars in the figure, we can see how much benefits are reduced for any given 
retirement age, as shown in Figure 6.   
 
What we see is that the size of the benefit cut depends on the pattern of 
adjustments for the age of starting benefits.  In the case of the US, the largest cut would 
fall on those claiming at age 62, even though the group claiming at age 62 have had lower 
lifetime earnings on average than those claiming at any later age, and those claiming at 
age 62 have higher mortality rates than those claiming at any later age.  This makes for an 
unattractive pattern of benefit cuts.  A direct proposal to make the largest benefit cuts on 
the poorest group with the shortest life expectancy would not be taken seriously.  Making 
such a proposal indirectly is no more appropriate. 
 
                                                 
8 Such an approach was taken in one of the plans put forth by the commission appointed by 
President Bush. 
9 One does need ten years of service to be eligible for retirement benefits in the US, but 
measurement of years of service plays no other role beyond basic eligibility.   15 
Moreover, the induced pattern of benefit cuts for any particular country is not 
transparent - making the discussion of how much to cut benefits in terms of how much to 
increase the age for full benefits an unfortunate choice of vocabulary since it obscures 
rather than clarifies whose benefits are reduced.  Similarly, to have the cost of benefits be 
independent of life expectancy, the relationship between the age for full benefits and life 
expectancy is not transparent either.  Proposals that preserve a constant ratio of or 
difference between life expectancy and the age for full benefits do not necessarily 
accomplish the goal of preserving the cost of the system despite mortality changes.   
 
To see the similarly working effects of increasing the years of service required for 
a full benefit, let us consider the rules in France.  Under current legislation the required 
years of service needed for a full benefit will increase from 40 to 41 between 2008 and 
2012 (and continue rising thereafter).  An increase from 40 to 41 reduces the benefit 
received by someone retiring at 65, which is proportional to the ratio of actual years of 
service to years of service needed for a full benefit (referred to as proratization).
10  
Replacing 40 by 41 in the denominator of this ratio would then be a 2.4 percent benefit 
cut (based on 40/41).  Someone retiring at age 65 would receive a benefit 2.4 percent 
lower than if the years of service for a full benefit had not increased.  This number is the 
same for any number of actual years of service 40 or below.  The calculation is similar 
for different numbers of required years of service. 
 
Someone retiring before age 65 would have benefit cuts from two sources.  One is 
the same 2.4 percent cut related to proratization.  In addition there would be an increase 
in the benefit reduction for having fewer than the full number of years of service, referred 
to as décote.
11  This reduction is linear in the gap to the years needed for a full benefit for 
any given rate of benefit reduction .  Thus it is a larger percentage cut the fewer the 
number of years of service.  The penalty (décote) for fewer years was 10 percent per year 
(2.5 percent per trimester) in 2004, but is decreasing in the future, being 7.5 percent in 
2008, 5.5 percent in 2012 and then stabilizing at 5 percent.  Someone retiring with 40 
                                                 
10 Since there is a maximum of one in the ratio, the decrease happens only for people with 40 or 
fewer years of service. 
11 The cuts are not additive, but one minus the cuts are multiplied to give the new benefit level.   16 
years of service when required years were 40 had no reduction.  Change the required 
number of years to 41 when the penalty rate is 5.5 percent per year and a person receives 
a 5.5 percent reduction along with the 2.4 percent reduction for everyone – receiving a 
7.8 percent cut from the increase in required years of service, ignoring the decrease in the 
penalty rate.  Someone with 39 years of service receives an 8.1 percent cut. And so it 
goes, the fewer the years of service the larger the percentage benefit cut from increasing 
the required years of service, as shown in figure 7.  Combining the decrease in the 
penalty rate with the increase in the required years of service would give a different 
pattern, but still one that is highly variable across different years of service in a way that 
has no apparent logic. 
 
Since changes to the full benefit age or full benefit years of service are a less 
transparent mechanism for reducing benefits than a direct reduction, a directly indexed 
adjustment of benefit levels for life expectancy seems preferable.  More generally, I think 
that systems would be better understood without the concept of a normal retirement age, 
relying on an earliest age for claiming and the increases in benefits as a consequence of a 
later start in benefits. 
 
Encouragement to save 
 
  Insofar as the mandatory pension system reduces replacement rates as part of 
adapting to longer lives, workers are likely to need additional voluntary savings if they 
are to have adequate replacement rates.
12  Both employers and government can play a 
major role in assisting and encouraging workers to save for retirement.  In the US, 
employer organized pension plans encourage workers to save by providing a mechanism 
for automatic retirement savings from earnings and, often, matching worker 
contributions.  Increasingly, US pension plans have been defined contribution plans, not 
defined benefit plans.  While some analysts are concerned with the shift in the US (and 
the UK) to greater reliance on defined contribution plans, I am not among them.  I have 
                                                 
12 Longer life expectancies are likely to be accompanied by a greater variance in life expectancy, 
and so in optimal individual savings rates.  This may enhance the value of the role for voluntary 
savings relative to mandatory savings.    17 
long thought that voluntary corporate defined benefit plans are not a good design given 
the problems associated with labor mobility and the regulation and insurance of adequate 
funding.  Particularly when supplementing a national defined benefit plan, defined 
contribution plans seem a better solution for both employees and employers.  Employer 
organized plans can be supplemented by individual retirement plans with financial 
intermediaries.  And the US gives a tax advantage to retirement savings organized 
through employers or individual arrangements. 
 
  One important principle from the perspectives of both worker well-being and 
capital market efficiency is that preferential tax treatment accorded such savings should 
be similarly available for different financial institutions that add similarly to national 
savings.  Favoring insurance companies over mutual funds or vice versa is not good for 
workers and not good for the economy. 
 
  Recently, there has been an explosion of analyses of how workers respond to 
employer-provided retirement savings opportunities (Beshears et al, 2005).  Much has 
been learned about how poorly many workers do in selecting a savings rate and in 
selecting an asset portfolio.  Moreover, much has been learned, drawing on behavioral 
economics, on how to induce workers to do better.  I do not have the time to go into this 
in detail, but key elements are the use of opt-out rather than opt-in for such plans, use of a 
high-quality default portfolio, and opportunities for changes in savings rates that begin in 
the future.  By choosing suitable defaults, workers who do not respond through inertia or 
other reasons can be guided toward a sensible savings rate and a sensible portfolio.  
Legislation may be needed to allow employers to follow such an approach without undue 
financial risk. 
 
Since individual arrangements with both insurance companies and mutual funds 
are far more expensive than when arrangements are done by larger institutions, both 
employers and the government have an important role to help workers get a better return 
on their savings.  I stress this point since it is easy to underestimate the extent to which 
administrative costs lower the accumulation available for retirement over the course of a   18 
40-year career.  This issue is quantified in Table 4 which shows how much accumulations 
are reduced by annual charges.  For example, a worker who is charged one percent of 
balances each year will have an accumulated balance at retirement nearly 20 percent 
smaller than if those charges were fully avoided.  Indeed, the ratio of the reduction of the 
accumulation over a 40-year career to annual charges on assets is roughly 20 to one, since 
over a 40-year career, deposits remain in accounts for roughly 20 years on average.  
While government- and employer-organized accounts can not avoid administrative 
charges, they can drastically reduce them.  This opportunity should be pursued. 
 
While much controversy surrounds approaches to reform of national pension 
systems, let us hope that any reform will include good design features about which there 
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Figure 4.  Benefit levels for different ages at the start of benefits in 
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Figure 5.  Benefit levels for different ages at the start of benefits in 
the US with the age for full benefits (normal retirement age) at 67 
and at 70 
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Figure 6.  Benefit reductions in the US from increasing the age for 
full benefits (normal retirement age) from 67 to 70 
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Figure 7.  Benefit reductions in France from increasing the years of 
service for full benefits from 40 to 41 
 
BENEFIT REDUCTIONS FROM INCREASING YEARS 
OF SERVICE FOR FULL BENEFITS FROM 40 TO 41










36 37 38 39 40































   28 
 Table 1: Regression Output (Early Retirement): 
 
Unused Labor Capacity = a + b ln(Tax Force) 
   
   a  b 
Coefficient  0.2551  0.1732 
Standard error  0.0412  0.0279 
t-stat  6.1938  6.2178 
R
2  0.8112   
 
 
Table 2: Regression output Male unemployment): 
 
Average MaleUE91_00 = g + d ln(Tax Force) 
 
   g  d 
Coefficient  0.0791  0.0002 
Standard error  0.0224  0.0152 
t-stat  3.5243  0.0102 
R
2  0.0000    
 
 
Table 3: Instrumental variables regression output: 
 
Average MaleUE91_00 = f0 + r0 Unused Labor Capacity 
 
   f0  r0 
Coefficient  0.0788  0.0009 
Standard error  0.0436  0.0875 
t-stat  1.8099  0.0102 
R
2  0.0021    
 
First stage: 
Unused Labor Capacity = f1 + r1 ln(Tax Force) 
 
   f1  r1 
Coefficient  0.2551  0.1732 
Standard error  0.0412  0.0279 
t-stat  6.1938  6.2178 
R
2  0.8112    
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Table 4.  Decline in Value of Accounts Due to Fees   
  After a 40-Year Work Career 
a 
   
Type and level of fees  Percentage decline in 
account value due to fees 
Front-load fees (percent of new contributions) of: 
1 percent  1 % 
10 percent  10 % 
20 percent  20 % 
Annual management fees (percent of account balance) of: 
0.1 percent  2.2 % 
0.5 percent  10.5 % 
1.0 percent  19.6 % 
     
    a.  Assuming real wage growth of 2.1 percent and a real 
annual return on investments of 4 percent.  With a larger 
difference between the rate of return and the wage growth 
rate, the charge ratio with annual management fees is 
slightly larger, and conversely.   30 
Appendix 
 
Appendix Table 1: Regression output (Unemployment): 
 
Average TotUE91_00 = ga + da ln(Tax Force) 
 
  
ga  da 
Coefficient  0.0758  0.0098 
Standard error  0.0303  0.0205 
t-stat  2.5030  0.4794 
R
2  0.0249    
 






ER to 69 
Average of 
Unemployment Rate for 
Males, (1991-2000) (%) 
Belgium  67  8.87  6.64 
Canada  45  2.37  9.81 
France  60  7.25  9.47 
Germany   48  3.45  7.96 
Italy  59  9.20  8.44 
Japan  22  1.65  3.31 
Netherlands  58  8.32  4.54 
Spain  47  2.49  15.01 
Sweden  35  2.18  7.16 
United Kingdom  55  3.77  9.19 
United States  37  1.57  5.68 
 
Source: Gruber and Wise (1999), LABORSTA (ILO) 
 
 
 
 